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Abstract
Using data from a two-year pricing experiment, we study the impact of sub-
sidy policies on weather insurance take-up. Results show that subsidies increase
future insurance take-up through their influence on payout experiences. Explor-
ing mechanisms of the payout effect, we find that for households that randomly
benefited from financial education, receiving a payout provides a one-time learn-
ing experience that improves take-up permanently. In contrast, households with
poor insurance knowledge continuously update take-up decisions based on recent
experiences with disasters and payouts. Combining subsidy policies with financial
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I Introduction
Households face different types of risks that can generate large fluctuations in
income and consumption. To shield individuals from risks, many governments
exercise great efforts on developing and marketing formal insurance products.
However, in both developing and developed countries, the value placed by in-
dividuals on insurance is usually surprisingly low,1 and initiatives to provide
information, subsidies, and to increase trust have had limited success (Cole et al.
(2013), Banerjee et al. (2019)). Many countries have given up on trying to sell
insurance and moved to make insurance mandatory.2
One reason of why learning about insurance is difficult is that "positive"
experience with insurance only happens when there is a negative shock, which is
rare. Moreover, the insurance literature has shown that even learning from these
bad events is imperfect, as their influence diminishes over time (Cole, Stein, and
Tobacman, 2014; Cai and Song, 2017).
In this paper, we study the case of a new weather insurance product for rice
producing households in China. We set up a novel experiment where we jointly
introduce two interventions: a subsidy policy to encourage early adoption and
personal experience, and a financial education program on how insurance works.
We trace subsequent adoption after two and four years to measure the long-
term impacts of the two policies, their interactions, and mechanisms. We show
that indeed only positive experience with insurance (receiving payouts) increases
demand, and that in general this effect does not persist over time. It is only when
people also receive education about insurance that they process the positive signal
which influences their take-up permanently.
We start with a theoretical framework in which we specify three recognized
1Finkelstein, Hendren, and Luttmer (2019) show that the willingness to pay for Medicaid
among low-income uninsured adults in the U.S. is only between 0.5 and 1.2 dollars per dollar
of the resource cost of providing Medicaid, itself only 40% of Medicaid’s total cost. Cole et al.
(2013) find an adoption rate of only 5%-10% for weather index insurance policy in two regions
of India in 2006. Higher take-up of weather insurance at market prices was observed in Ghana,
but only following a year of extensive payouts (Karlan et al., 2014).
2For example, universal and free crop insurance has been provided to smallholder farmers in
Mexico since 2003 under the CADENA program. In India, the Weather-Based Crop Insurance
Scheme offered by the government mandates all farmers that take commercial bank loans for
specified crops in preselected locations to buy insurance.
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channels through which an initial exposure to insurance can affect long-term
insurance demand: (1) the direct effect of experiencing payout, with an expected
positive effect on take-up if there has been an insured shock and a payout has
been received, and a negative discouragement effect if a premium has been paid
and either no shock occurred or a shock occurred without a corresponding payout,
(2) the social effect of observing network payout experiences, which follows the
same process of positive and negative effects in relation to stochastic payouts,
and (3) a habit forming effect, with past use of the product influencing current
demand.3 We model how these channels would be impacted by subsidies through
three separate effects: (1) a scope effect where subsidies enhance take-up and
hence the opportunity of experiencing or witnessing payouts, (2) an attention
effect where a lower insurance cost for the individual leads to less attention being
given to information generated by payout experiences, and (3) a price anchoring
effect, where low past prices reduce current willingness to pay (Fischer et al.,
2019).
We then estimate the impact of subsidy policies on insurance take-up using
a two-year randomized field experiment, which includes 134 villages with about
3,500 households in rural China. In the first year, we randomized subsidy policies
at the village level by offering either a partial subsidy of 70% of the actuarially
fair price or a full subsidy. We also offered a financial education program about
insurance products to randomly selected households in 86 randomly selected vil-
lages, out of the 134 sample villages. In the second year, we randomly assigned
eight prices to the product at the household level, with subsidies ranging from
40% to 90%.
Reduced form results show that households receiving a full subsidy in the first
year exhibit greater demand for insurance in the second year, but that the price
elasticity of demand is not statistically different compared to that of households
receiving a partial subsidy. Since insurance is an experience good, the effective-
ness of subsidy policies may depend crucially on farmers’ experience with the
product. We then explore the impact of an important element of farmers’ ex-
3The influence of own and network payout experiences have been identified by Cole, Stein,
and Tobacman (2014), Gallagher (2014), and Karlan et al. (2014). Persistence in adoption has
been shown for insurance by Hill, Robles, and Ceballos (2016), and for agricultural inputs by
Carter, Laajaj, and Yang (2019).
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perience with the insurance program - whether they received a payout (direct
effect) or observed friends receiving payouts (social effect), on future insurance
adoption. We show that, first, directly receiving a payout has a positive effect on
second year take-up, and makes insurance demand less price elastic. This effect
is stronger for households that paid for insurance. To explain why the payout
effect is smaller under the full subsidy policy, we show that people paid less at-
tention to the payout information if they received the insurance for free. Second,
for those not insured in the first year, we find that observing payouts in their
network increases their second-year demand. Lastly, we find no evidence of price
anchoring or habit formation. Together these results suggest that the impact of
the subsidies on insurance take-up comes through its potential of increasing the
opportunity to receive or observe payouts, although with a trade-off in that the
payout effect itself is lower when the insurance was received for free.
Turning to the long-term effect of observing payouts, with four years of in-
surance take-up and payout data, we show that there is heterogeneity depending
on farmers’ initial level of financial literacy. Specifically, for randomly selected
households that benefited from financial education in the first year, receiving a
payout provides a one-time learning effect which influences their take-up perma-
nently. For them, experience of payouts reinforces their understanding of how
insurance works and its benefits. In contrast, for households that did not benefit
from financial education, such learning does not occur. They update insurance
take-up decisions yearly based on recent changes in experience with disasters and
returns of purchasing insurance. In that case, subsidies would need to be contin-
uously provided to maintain a good overall take-up rate if no disaster happened.
The policy implication is that to make subsidy policies effective in sustaining in-
surance adoption over time, it has to be combined with other interventions such
as financial education to improve farmers’ initial insurance knowledge, so that
they have better capacity to learn from experiences with the product.
The long-term effects also speak to the mechanisms of the payout effect: for
households that participated in the first year financial education, the real expe-
rience of payouts reinforced their understanding of insurance concepts and as a
result improved voluntary take-up permanently; for those that did not partici-
pate, the main factor driving the short-run payout effect is changes in experience
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with disasters and returns of purchasing insurance. We also use additional tests
to rule out that the payout effect comes from changes in risk attitudes and per-
ceived probability of disasters, from improved trust on the insurance company,
or from a liquidity effect.
Our work builds on and contributes to three main literatures. First, our study
provides insights on the observed slow diffusion of new technologies and financial
products (Bridle et al., 2018). In the case of insurance products, existing research
has analyzed factors influencing take-up such as liquidity constraints, lack of
financial literacy, present bias, and lack of trust in the insurance provider (Giné,
Townsend, and Vickery, 2008; Gaurav, Cole, and Tobacman, 2011; Cole et al.,
2013; Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2015; Casaburi and Willis, 2018; Banerjee
et al., 2019). However, even when these barriers are removed in experimental
settings, insurance take-up remains low (Bridle et al., 2018). Our detailed analysis
of the payout effects suggests that it is the stochastic nature of payouts and the
low level of financial literacy among farmers that make them unable to learn
about the insurance benefits and contribute to the low take-up.
Second, this paper sheds light on the impact and design of subsidy policies.
A number of studies have examined the impact of subsidies on the take-up of
products where product experience is non-stochastic. For example, Dupas (2014)
finds that a one-time subsidy on insecticide-treated bednets has a positive effect
on long-term take-up, which is mainly driven by a positive learning effect. In
another study, Fischer et al. (2019) find suggestive evidence that positive learning
can offset the negative effect of price anchoring in the long-term adoption of
health products. Finally, Carter, Laajaj, and Yang (2019) find that subsidies
in Mozambique induce long-term persistence in the demand for fertilizer and
improved seeds, which they attribute to both direct and social learning effects.
Our paper is among the first to study the impact of subsidies on financial product
adoption and its mechanisms. More importantly, we show that for products with
complex stochastic benefits such as insurance, an effective subsidy policy has to
be implemented together with education programs to enhance people’s capacity
to learn from their personal experiences with the product.
Third, our results also contribute to the literature on the effect of personal
experience on decision-making. Existing studies have shown the importance of
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experience on consumption and financial decisions (Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2008;
Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Haselhuhn et al., 2012; Gallagher, 2014). We not
only provide evidence on the impact of personal experience on insurance take-up,
but also exploit the exogenous individual-level variation in payout experiences to
identify different mechanisms of the effect.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we explain the background for the
insurance product in China. In section 3, we present the experimental design and
discuss the data collected. In section 4, we develop a model of insurance demand.
In sections 5, we give evidence on the subsidy effect and the payout experience
effect. In section 6, we show the long-term effects of payout and heterogeneity by
financial education. Section 7 discusses other mechanisms of the payout effect.
Section 8 concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
II Background
Rice is the most important food crop in China, with nearly 50% of the country’s
farmers engaged in its production. In order to maintain food security and shield
farmers from negative weather shocks,4 in 2009 the Chinese government asked
the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC) to design and offer the first
rice production insurance policy to rural households in 31 pilot counties.5 The
program was expanded to 62 counties in 2010 and to 99 in 2011. The experiment
was conducted in 2010 and 2011 in randomly selected villages included in the
2010 expansion in Jiangxi province, one of China’s major rice producing areas.
In these villages, rice production is the main source of income for most farmers.
Given that the product was new, farmers and government officials had limited
understanding of it and no previous interaction with PICC.
The product in our study is an area-yield index weather insurance that covers
4In the household survey, we asked farmers to identify the major risks they face in their
agricultural production. Answers give weather shocks as the main risk that farmers are con-
cerned with (71% of respondents list it as a major risk), followed by price risks (55%), labor
shortages (28%), contracts (8%), and financing (5%).
5Before 2009, if a major natural disaster occurred, the government made payments to house-
holds whose production had been seriously hurt by the disaster. However, the level of transfer
was usually far from sufficient to help affected farmers resume normal production levels.
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natural disasters, including heavy rains, floods, windstorms, extremely high or
low temperatures, and droughts. It differs from a weather index insurance, as
the amount of payout depends on area average loss rather than a weather index.
If any of these disasters occurs and leads to a 30% or more average loss in yield,
farmers are eligible to receive payouts from the insurance company. The amount
of the payout increases linearly with the loss rate in yield, from 60 RMB per mu
for a 30% loss to a maximum payout of 200 RMB per mu for a full loss. Areas for
indexing are typically fields that include the plots of 5 to 10 farmers. The average
loss rate in yield is assessed by a committee composed of insurance agents and
agricultural experts.6 Since the average gross income from cultivating rice in the
experimental sites is around 800 RMB per mu, and production costs around 400
RMB per mu, the insurance policy covers 25% of the average gross income or
50% of average production costs. The actuarially fair price for the policy is 12
RMB per mu, or 3% of production costs, per season.7 The insurance company
markets the insurance product in February each year, before the first season of
rice cultivation in March. If a farmer decides to buy the insurance, the premium
is deducted from a rice production subsidy deposited annually in January to each
farmer’s bank account, with no cash payment needed, removing any potential
liquidity constraint problem, as identified for example by Giné, Townsend, and
Vickery (2008) and Cole et al. (2013) in India.8 Insurance payouts are also directly
deposited to the same bank account.
Like with any area-yield index insurance product, it is possible that insured
farmers may collude. However, the moral hazard problem should not be large
here as the maximum payout (200 RMB/mu) is much lower than the expected
profit (800 RMB/mu), and the product does require natural disasters to happen
6One concern of the contract design is that good farmers might have less incentive to pur-
chase insurance as the payout is based on the fields average. We estimated the impact of
baseline yield on take-up but did not find a significant effect.
71 RMB = 0.15 USD; 1 mu = 0.165 acre. Farmers produce two or three seasons of rice
each year. The product was priced based on the county-level historical rice yield data collected
yearly by the agricultural department. The premium is designed to cover the expected payouts
and transaction costs associated with the product.
8Starting in 2004, the Chinese government provided production subsidies to rice farmers in
order to increase production incentives.
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in order to trigger payouts.9
III Experimental Design and Data
III.a Experimental Design
The experimental site consists in 134 randomly selected villages in Jiangxi Province
with around 3500 households. We carried out a two-year randomized experiment
in Spring 2010 and 2011.
The experimental design is presented in Figure 1. The main treatment in-
volves randomization of the subsidy level in each year of the study. In the first
year, we randomized the subsidy policy at the village level, with villages stratified
by their total number of households. The insurance product was first offered at
3.6 RMB/mu, i.e. with a 70% subsidy on the fair price, to all households in or-
der to observe take-up at that price. Two days after this initial sale, households
from 62 randomly selected villages were surprised with an announcement that
the insurance will be offered for free to all, regardless of whether they had agreed
to buy it or not at the initial price. These villages are referred to as the "free
sample" and the remaining 72 villages as the "non-free sample". This design
allows us to distinguish "buyers" of insurance who agree to pay the offer price of
3.6 RMB/mu from "users" of insurance that include all buyers from the non-free
sample group as well as all households from the free sample group. As reported
in Figure 1, the insurance take-up rate at the 3.6 RMB/mu price is similar in the
two samples at around 40-43%.
Note that the first year of our study coincided with a fairly large occurrence of
adverse weather events that triggered insurance payouts, with 59% of the insured
receiving a payout from the insurance company.
In the second year of the study, we randomized the subsidy level from 90 to
40% of the fair price at the household level. This creates eight different price
treatment subgroups. Except for the price, everything else remained the same
9If there were moral hazard problems, the likelihood of collusion should increase with the
price paid by farmers. We tested the impact of price on the payout probability and found a
small and insignificant effect.
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in the insurance contract as in the first year.10 Similar to the design in Dupas
(2014), only two or three prices are assigned within each village.11 For example,
if one village is assigned a price set (1.8, 3.6, 5.4), each household in that village
is randomly assigned to one of these three prices. To randomize price sets at the
village level, we stratified villages by size (and first year village-level insurance
payout rate). To randomize prices within the set, we stratified households by rice
production area.
In both years, we offered information sessions about the insurance policy to
farmers, in which we explained the insurance contract, the amount of government
subsidy, the responsibility of the insurance company, the rules for loss verifica-
tion, and the procedures for making payouts. Households made their insurance
purchase decision immediately after the information session. In the second-year
information session, we also informed farmers of the list of people in the village
who were insured and of the payouts made during the first year at both the
household and village levels.
Two complementary randomized treatments were implemented in the first
year. First, we offered a financial education program about insurance products
in 86 randomly selected villages, out of the 134 sample villages. In each of
those villages, around 50% of households were randomly selected to receive the
financial education in a group meeting. The insurance education includes the
following main elements: (i) explanation of the difference between an insurance
program and a government subsidy; (ii) information on the historical yield loss
in the study region; and (iii) exercises in computing the expected benefit or
loss from purchasing insurance for five continuous years depending on different
disaster frequencies and levels. This last theme is extremely important because a
key reason many farmers give for not buying insurance is that they resent losing
money in years without a bad shock. In the training, we use concrete examples to
show that insurance is a type of product that needs to be purchased continuously
10This two-year price randomization scheme is similar to Karlan et al. (2014). But by eliciting
demand before surprising people with free offer in the first year, we can look at price effects
absent of selection.
11Price sets with either two or three different prices are randomly assigned at the village
level. For villages assigned with two prices (P1, P2), P1 <= 3.6 and P2 > 3.6; for villages with
three prices (P1, P2, P3), P1 < 3.6, P2 ∈ (3.6, 4.5), and P3 > 4.5.
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to ensure that you will receive a payout in a year of disaster, and that the payout
will be more than compensate all the premiums you have to pay (this is the case
with this heavily subsidized product). Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2015) show
that participating in these education sessions substantially improved insurance
take-up and understanding of insurance.
Second, we randomized a default option at the village level. In about 40%
of our sample villages, we assigned households with a default "BUY" option,
meaning the farmer must sign off if he does not want to purchase the insurance.
We assigned the other villages with a default "NOT BUY" option, meaning the
farmer must sign on if he decides to buy the insurance. All groups otherwise
received the same pitch for the product. The randomized financial education and
default options will be used in some estimations as instrumental variables for the
insurance purchase decisions.
One concern in the experimental design is that since farmers in free villages
were surprised by a price drop in the first year of the study, they might expect
a similar price change in the second year.12 We use two tests to rule out this
concern. First, in the second year survey we asked farmers the post-subsidy
premium and whether they expect further price drop. We then test the impact
of the first year free treatment on answers to those questions. Results in column
(1) of Table A1 suggest that farmers in free villages are not more likely to expect a
price drop than those in non-free villages. Second, we use a sample of households
from a separate experiment in which we randomized prices at the household level
in the first year.13 In that sample, there was no intervention in the second year
and everyone received a post-subsidy price of 3.6 RMB. We only keep those that
were assigned with a zero price during the first year in the price experiment
sample, and then compare their second year insurance take-up with those in free
villages. We show in column (2) of Table A1 that being surprised by receiving the
insurance for free in the first year does not affect decision-making in the second
year. As a result, the "surprise" treatment does not distort farmers’ willingness
12We did emphasize during the information sessions that the price is final and there won’t
be further price changes.
13The price experiment was in parallel to the experiment that we report in this paper. The
experiment includes 12 villages, which were randomly selected from the population of villages
exactly like the 134 sample villages used in this paper.
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to pay for insurance in subsequent years.
III.b Data and Summary Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on PICC administrative data of insurance pur-
chase and payout, and on household surveys conducted after the insurance in-
formation session each year. Since almost all households produce rice, and all
rice producers were invited to the information session with a more than 90%
attendance rate, this provides us with a quasi census of the population of these
134 villages, a representative sample of rice-producers in Jiangxi. In total, 3474
households were surveyed. Most of the analysis that follows refer to the two
years 2010 and 2011 of the experiment for which we have both administrative
and survey data. However, in section VII on mechanisms of the payout effect, we
will also use administrative data on payout and take-up for the years 2012-2014
when prices were uniformly set to their base value of 3.6 RMB.
We present the summary statistics of key variables in Table 1. The data in
Panel A show that household heads are almost exclusively male and cultivate on
average 12 mu (0.80 ha) of rice per year. Rice production accounts on average
for almost 70% of total household income. Households indicate an average risk
aversion of 0.2 on a scale of zero to one (risk averse).14 In Panel B, we summarize
the payouts issued during the year following the first insurance offer. With a
windstorm hitting several sample villages, 59% of all insured households received
a payout in the first year of our study, with an average payout size of around 102
RMB. The payout rate was not significantly different between households in free
vs. non-free villages, at 61% and 57%, respectively. For the non-free villages, this
corresponds to 24% of all households. All households, regardless of whether they
purchased the insurance or not, could also observe their friends’ experiences.
Identification of friends comes from a social network census conducted before
the experiment in year one. In that survey, we asked household heads to list five
close friends, either within or outside the village, with whom they most frequently
14Risk attitudes are elicited by asking households to choose between a certain amount with
increasing values of 50, 80, 100, 120, and 150 RMB (riskless option A), and a risky gamble of
(200 RMB, 0) with probability (0.5, 0.5) (risky option B). The proportion of riskless options
chosen is then used as a measure of risk aversion, which ranges from 0 to 1.
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discuss rice production or financial issues.15 In the sample of non-free villages,
68% of households had at least one friend receiving a payout, while in free villages,
81% of households observed at least one of their friends receiving a payout. As
a result, in villages with full subsidies, most households were able to experience
the benefits of insurance by themselves, or could observe their friends’ positive
experiences with the product.16 Lastly, Panel C shows that the first year take-up
rate was 41% while the second year was 53%, with this increase corresponding to
a 7.3 (16.3) percentage point increase in the non-free (free) villages.
To verify the free and price randomizations, we regress the seven main house-
hold baseline characteristics (gender, age, household size, household head educa-
tion, area of rice production, risk aversion, and perceived probability of future
disasters) on the insurance price or free intervention and a set of region dum-
mies:17
(1) Xij = α0 + α1Interventionij + ηj + ij
where Xij represents household characteristics, Interventionij is either the post-
subsidy price in year 2 or whether the household is in a free village in year 1,
and ηj indicates region fixed effect. Table 2 reports the results. All coefficient
estimates are small in magnitude and none is statistically significant, confirming
the validity of the two randomizations.
IV Theoretical Framework
The net utility of buying insurance is posited to be additive in perceived benefits
(related to the probability of receiving a payout) and costs. Perceived benefits in
15About 92% of the network connections are within villages, suggesting that inter-village
spillover effects should be small. For a detailed description of the network data, see Cai,
de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2015).
16The correlation between self and network payout is about 0.33, meaning that there is
substantial heterogeneity of yield loss within villages. This is because the disaster that happened
in the first year was windstorms, and the yield loss depends on the very specific location of the
plot.
17In this paper, region refers to the administrative villages, while village refers to natural
villages. Administrative village is the lowest level of governance in China, normally composed
of about 10 natural villages.
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year t include a prior expected value EVt−1 which is modified as the household
gets exposed to the functioning of insurance, getting more familiar with it and
observing the distribution of payouts. The additional information obtained in a
specific year t is a function of three factors: own experience with payouts in the
previous year Vt−1 for those insured, network experience of payouts NetVt−1, and
It−1, an indicator of whether the individual was insured the previous year. With-
out specifying further, we write this function as g(Vt−1, NetVt−1, It−1), and the
perceive benefits in year t as EVt−1+λg(Vt−1, NetVt−1, It−1), where λ controls the
rate at which information from last year is taken into account. When λ = 0, there
is no updating in the expected benefits from insurance experience. The higher
the parameter, the more responsive individuals are to recent realizations. The
model can thus capture a variety of updating rules, including a full-information
Bayesian updating where the weight given to last year corresponds to the new
statistical information embedded in it, but also a "recency bias" where more re-
cent events are disproportionally weighted. We further specify λ to be a function
of the price paid for the insurance: λt = λ(pt−1). In this way, our model is simi-
lar to a Bayesian learning model that allows for incomplete information or poor
recall related to past events as considered by Gallagher (2014). However, in our
model, a belief is updated regarding the value of the insurance, as it is really the
payout experience and not the weather event that influences subsequent take-up
decisions, as we will see later.
The cost of insurance includes three terms: the price at which the insurance
is offered pt, a gain-loss in utility which we assume to be a linear function of
the difference between the offered price and a reference price, γ(pt − prt), and a
transaction cost δt. Transaction costs are assumed to depend on past experience,
i.e., δt = δ(It−1). Adding a preference shock t, the overall utility of purchasing
insurance for an individual then becomes:
(2) Wt − t ≡ EVt−1 + λtg(Vt−1, NetVt−1, It−1) + βpt + γ (pt − prt) It−1 + δt − t
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In the experiment, we analyze the insurance purchase in year 2 such that:
Buy2 = 1 if 2 < W2 ≡ α + λ(p1)g(V1, NetV1, I1) + βp2 + γ (p2 − p1) I1 + δ(I1)
= 0 otherwise(3)
Recall that the insurance was first offered to all farmers at a unique price p∗1 in
order to elicit their demand for insurance. Then, in a random sample of villages,
farmers were "surprised" by a government decision to give out the insurance for
free. The reference price that enters the second year decision, p1, is thus either
the initial price offer p∗1 or 0. This design allows us to separate the insurance
purchase Buy1 (at p∗1) from access I1, which also includes farmers that receive
the insurance in year 1 for free after choosing not to buy it originally.
The different mechanisms that may influence the purchase of insurance in the
second year are readily seen in the W2 expression:
• Effect of own payout experience: This mechanism enters through the real-
ized V1 in expression (3), reflecting updating of information, with eventually
a recency bias in demand. Neglecting any network effect, for those insured
in year 1, if households experienced a payout, we expect this term to be
positive and their demand to increase. In contrast, with no payout, we
expect the term to be negative and insurance demand to drop, capturing a
discouragement effect.
• Effect of observing network payouts : This mechanism is qualitatively similar
as that of receiving a payout and enters through NetV1 in g(V1, NetV1, I1).
• Transaction costs enter through the term δ(I1).
The effects of first year price subsidy on second year take-up can be also
identified in equation (3):
• A scope effect or potential for experience through its determination of I1.
• An attention effect with its influence on the rate of adjustment in expecta-
tion through λ(p1).
• A price anchoring effect with the term γ (p2 − p1).
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V The Effect of First-Year Subsidies on Second-
Year Insurance Take-up
V.a Aggregate Effect
In this section, we estimate the aggregate impact of the first year subsidy on the
second year insurance demand with the following specification:
(4) Takeupij2 = α1Priceij2+α2Freeij1+α3Priceij2 ∗Freeij1+α4Xij + ηj + ij
where Takeupij2 is an indicator for the purchase decision made by each household
in year two, Priceij2 is the price that a household faced in year two, Freeij1
is an indicator for being under full subsidy in the first year, Xij are baseline
household characteristics including gender, age, household size, household head
education, area of rice production, risk aversion, and perceived probability of
future disasters,18 and ηj are region dummies.
Results in Table 3, column (1), show that the second year take-up rate among
households offered a full subsidy in the first year is higher than that of households
offered a partial subsidy (by 5.97 percentage points, about a 12% increase, signif-
icant at the 10% level). Adding controls in column (2) does not affect the result,
which is expected since they are orthogonal to the treatment. This suggests that
offering higher subsidies does improve the level of insurance demand beyond the
year it is implemented. The results in column (3) show that households with
different first year subsidies do not differ in the slope of their demand curve. The
slope parameter of −0.49 translates into a price elasticity of -0.44 for the price
level of 3.6 RMB/mu and the corresponding take-up rate of 40%. This is lower
than the [-1.04, -1.16] range for the price elasticity found in Gujarat by Cole et al.
(2013), but of the same order of magnitude as that in the U.S. (in the [-.13, -.74]
range, reported in O’Donoghue (2014)).
18The first four characteristics are pre-determined and won’t be affected by any treatments.
We tested the impact of the free and price randomizations on the second year area of rice
production, risk aversion, and perceived probability of future disasters. The magnitude of
impact is small and all effects are insignificant.
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V.b Effect of Experiencing Payouts - Direct and Social Ef-
fects
From the policy-maker’s perspective, the objective of providing subsides on insur-
ance is to give more farmers the opportunity to experience the product, so that
they can learn about the insurance benefits and will purchase the product even if
subsidies are removed in the future. As a result, the effectiveness of subsidy poli-
cies depends crucially on farmers’ experience with the product. In this section,
we explore the impact of an important element of farmers’ experience with the
insurance program - whether they received a payout (direct efect) or observed
friends receiving payouts (social effect), on longer-term insurance adoption. We
also study the impact of subsidy levels on the payout experience effect. The sub-
sidy effect can be ambiguous because on the one hand, a subsidy can increase
initial take-up rates, meaning more people may receive or observe payouts; On
the other hand, if a household has not paid for the insurance, less attention may
be given to the payout outcomes.19
To explore the impact of payout experience on subsequent take-up, we first
examine the effect of directly receiving a payout in the first year on second year
insurance demand. To maintain sample comparability, we restrict this analysis
to those households that pay for insurance (in the non-free villages) or are willing
to do so (in the free villages) in the first year. Figure 2 compares the insurance
demand curves for households that receive a payout to those for households that
do not receive a payout. The figure shows that receiving a payout induces a
higher level of renewal of the insurance contract and makes the insurance less
price elastic. The corresponding estimation equation is:
(5)
Takeupij2 = α1Priceij2 +α2Payoutij1 +α3Priceij2 ∗Payoutij1 +α4Xij + ηj + ij
where Payoutij1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the household received a
payout in year 1.
19For experience-based goods, two arguments have been given for why the effect could be
lower when people pay less: the "screening effect" of prices could be lower (Ashraf, Berry, and
Shapiro (2010)) or people who pay more for a product may feel more obliged to use it; thus,
the "sunk cost" effect is higher with lower subsidies.
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We report the estimation results in Table 4. For households that received a
partial subsidy in the first year (columns (1) and (2)), receiving a payout im-
proves their second year take-up rate by 36.8 percentage points, and mitigates
the subsidy removal (price) effect by around 80%.20 To further control for any
direct effect due to the severity of a weather-related loss, we use a regression dis-
continuity method, with the loss rate as the running variable and instrumenting
payout with the 30% loss rate threshold. The results of this analysis, in column
(3), show that the payout effect is still large and significant, suggesting that the
weather shock event does not explain the payout effect.21 For households that
received a full subsidy in the first year (columns (4)-(6)), the magnitude of the
payout effect is only about half of that observed for households that paid some
amount for their insurance. The effect of a payout on the slope of the second
year demand curve is similar in size but is less significant.22
To further characterize the payout effect, note in Figure 2 that absent a pay-
out, there is a substantial decline in take-up rate at 3.6 RMB/mu in year 2,
especially for those who paid for insurance. Demand after a payout is higher
among those that paid for the insurance in the first year. Column (7) of Table
4 confirms this: in absence of payout, the demand for insurance is higher after a
year of free experience than it is if households have paid some amount for their
insurance. However, the opposite holds true if a payout has been received. These
results suggest that providing a full subsidy mitigates payout response, with less
of a decline in demand when there is no payout but also a smaller positive effect
when there is a payout.
We next examine the effect of observing payouts in your network on sub-
sequent insurance take-up. To do so, we include the network payout variable,
NetPayHigh. This is a dummy variable that indicates whether more than half
20We also test the impact of the amount of payout received in the first year on second year
take-up rates (Table A2). The effect pattern is similar to that indicated in Table 4.
21Allowing different functions on both sides of the discontinuity does not change the result.
22Since the insurance product is area-based, the actual loss rate that a farmer experienced
could be different from the loss rate on which payout was issued. However, in our case the basis
risk is low. We calculated the theoretical payout amount using the self-reported household level
loss rate and compared it with the real payout amount. We found that the absolute difference
is very small (mean difference is 9.3 RMB, with a standard deviation of 24.4 RMB). We also
re-estimated columns (3) and (6) in Table 4 controlling for the difference between theoretical
and real payouts, and results remain the same.
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of the insured members within a farmer’s personal network received a payout in
the first year. The results in Table 5, column (1) indicate that the effect of ob-
serving payouts in your network on subsequent insurance take-up is much smaller
among households that received a full subsidy.
To better understand the interaction between the direct and social effects of
payouts, we look at the results for four groups separately, defined by whether
households were willing to pay for the insurance or not in the first year, and
whether they have received it for free. The estimation equation is as follows:
Takeupij2 =α1Priceij2 + α2NetPayHighij1 + α3Payoutij1
+α4NetPayHighij1 ∗ Payoutij1 + α5NetTakeupij1 + ηj + ij(6)
where NetTakeupij1 is the proportion of friends in one’s social network who
purchased the insurance in the first year, instrumented by the share of friends
receiving the financial education treatment and the average first-year default
option.23
Column (2) of Table 5 shows that households not insured in year 1 (and
hence without any direct experience) are strongly influenced by their network
experience. In contrast, those that purchased the insurance or were willing to
purchase it are solely affected by their own experience (columns (3) and (5)).24
Households that would not have purchased the insurance but received it for free
seem to be influenced by either own experience or their network experience with
a similar degree. We also confirm in this table that the effect of one’s own
experience with payout is smaller when the household received the insurance for
free.
This begs the question of why the payout effect is smaller when households
received the insurance for free. We suggest that it is mainly driven by differences
23One problem of using Default as the IV is that it might influence the information that
people have about the product. We tested the impact of Default on knowledge of the insurance
product and the level of trust on the insurance company in year 1, attendance of the second
year information session, and understanding of the first year payout outcomes. All effects are
small and not significant.
24We use another indicator of network payouts - a dummy variable indicating whether a
household has at least one friend receiving payout, for robustness check. Results are similar as
reported in Table A3.
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in the salience of insurance benefits. Specifically, households who paid for the
insurance are more attentive to the payout outcome and thus experience a larger
payout effect. To support this argument, we examine household attendance in the
second year information session and their performance in a short knowledge quiz
about payout outcomes.25 Table A4 shows no significant difference in the atten-
dance rate of the second year information session between villages with different
first year subsidy policies (column (1)). However, on questions testing a house-
hold’s knowledge of the payout outcomes, insurance takers in non-free villages
are much more likely to answer the questions correctly compared with those who
received the insurance for free (column (2)). Similarly, we show in column (3)
that insurance takers in non-free villages had a higher probability of increasing
investment in rice production than their counterparts in free villages.26 These
results suggest that households that received a full subsidy paid less attention
to insurance outcomes, reducing the salience of payouts. They are also probably
less aware of the fact that they were insured and value the product less, inducing
a smaller impact of being insured on agricultural investment.
Overall, we conclude that households’ experience with payouts is an impor-
tant determinant of subsequent insurance take-up.27 Providing subsidies has both
positive and negative impacts on the payout effect - on the one hand, by enlarg-
ing the coverage of insurance, it increases the opportunity for farmers to either
directly experience a payout or observe payouts paid to their friends; on the other
25The quiz includes questions testing a household’s knowledge of the payout rate in their
village, the average magnitude of payout amount, and who received payouts.
26We also report that among the non-takers, the provision of free insurance raised the prob-
ability of increasing rice production investment from 24% to 32.2%.
27We also tested the price anchoring and habit formation effects but both are small and in-
significant. Specifically, we examine the price anchoring effect by studying the set of households
that were willing to purchase the insurance at 3.6 RMB/mu in the first year and were assigned
a price lower than or equal to 3.6 RMB/mu in the second year. For this group, the second year
price is an increase for those that receive a full subsidy in the first year, and a decrease or no
change for those that received a partial subsidy. If there was an anchoring effect, we should
see a lower second-year take-up rate among households with full subsidy in the first year. Re-
gression results in Table A5 show that the difference between those that were fully subsidized
and those that were not is small and insignificant. As a result, we do not find evidence of a
price anchoring effect. We rule out the habit formation effect in Table 6 - after controlling for
payout experiences, whether a household is insured or not in previous years does not affect
the subsequent take-up (please note that to reduce the length of the table the coefficients of
previous take-up variables are not reported there).
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hand, it reduces the attention paid to these payout experiences. The net of the
two is in our case positive, and the second year take-up in free villages is higher
than in non-free villages. Given the importance of this payout effect, we explore
in the next sections its long term impact, heterogeneity, and mechanisms.
VI Long-Term Effect of Payout and Heterogene-
ity by Financial Education
Although receiving payouts substantially increased immediate insurance take-up,
the impact can be different in the long-run. The persistence of payout effects may
depend on whether receiving a payout can provide a one-time learning experience
that complements or confirms what the farmer previously understood of the in-
surance product. If that is the case, experiencing a payout once can permanently
improve future insurance take-up, and any additional payout experience would
not have further impacts. On the other hand, farmers can accumulate payout
experiences, possibly weighting the experiences differently over time, either with
decreasing weights as a second or a third experience of payout teaches you less,
or in the opposite direction with larger weights given to more recent events. To
explore these possibilities, in this section we analyze the impact of receiving pay-
outs on long-term insurance take-up using additional years of data on insurance
take-up and payout.
Specifically, we examine the impact of the first three years’ payout experiences
on the 4th year insurance take-up, with the following estimation equation:
Takeupij4 =α1Payoutij1 + α2Payoutij2 + α3Payoutij3
+α12Payoutij1 ∗ Payoutij2 + α13Payoutij1 ∗ Payoutij3




βkInsuredijk + ηj + ij(7)
where Takeupij4 indicates the take-up decision in year 4. Payoutijk is a dummy
variable equal to one if the household received a payout in year k. Households
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receive payouts only if they purchased insurance and experienced a yield loss
greater than 30% induced by weather shocks. Since the insurance take-up de-
cisions are endogenous, the payout variables are also endogenous. We take ad-
vantage of the randomized free intervention, default option, and second year
price, which generated exogenous variations in insurance take-up, and estimate
the model with 2SLS. The instruments are Freeij1, Defaultij1, Priceij2, and
their interactions with the weather realizations Lossijk, Lossijk ∗ Lossijl, and
Lossij1 ∗Lossij2 ∗Lossij3, where Lossijk is a dummy variable indicating whether
the household experienced a yield loss greater than 30% in the previous year.
We perform the following tests to examine the one-time learning hypothesis:
α2 + α12 = 0
α3 + α13 = 0
α3 + α23 = 0
indicating that receiving a payout in year 2 has no influence if a payout was
received in year 1, and receiving a payout in year 3 has no influence if a payout
was received in either year 1 or 2.
Rejection of one-time learning (in favor of a positive accumulation of expe-
rience) would indicate that farmers continuously adjust their take-up decisions
according to previous years disaster and payout experiences. An interesting pat-
tern of weights given to past experiences is where more recent payout experiences
have larger influence on the take-up of insurance than older experiences, implying:
α3 > α2 > α1 > 0.
An extreme case of paying attention only to the most recent event would be
characterized by: 
α1 + α12 = 0
α1 + α13 = 0
α2 + α23 = 0
α1 + α2 + α12 + α13 + α23 = 0
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indicating that payouts received in any year has no influence if a payout is received
later.
We report the result in Table 6. In columns (1)-(3), we look at the main
effects of payouts only. In columns (4)-(6) we then include all the interaction
terms in order to test the one-time learning hypothesis and the recency effect.28
Results reported in column (1) for the whole sample suggest that the payout
effect shows a significant decaying trend as earlier payout experience has smaller
impacts on long-term take-up than recent payout experience. Results in column
(4) support three findings: (i) The one-time learning hypothesis is rejected (see
Panel Test A). Insurance take-up does not stabilize after receiving the initial pay-
out; (ii) however, receiving one and only one payout has a long-term effect, but
with a strong decaying trend as α3 > α2 > α1 > 0 (Panel Test C); and (iii) there
is suggestive evidence that when farmers receive more than one payout, only
the most recent experience influences the current year take-up decision (Panel
Test B). These results are consistent with what the literature defines as a "re-
cency effect" (Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993; Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000;
Erev and Haruvy, 2013; Cai and Song, 2017). This literature has demonstrated
that experience gained during the final moments of a lab experiment impacts
subsequent evaluations, and that participants assign greater weight to the latter
moments in assessing an experiment. For example, Cai and Song (2017) find
that the hypothetical experience of disasters and insurance payouts obtained in
insurance games significantly affects real insurance take-up, but that experience
gained in the latter part of the game has a much larger impact. The recency effect
can be explained by the fact that memory fades over time, leading individuals to
be more likely to remember more recent experiences, so that recent experiences
of disasters and payouts make disasters and returns of purchasing insurance more
salient when making their current period purchase decisions.
In looking for what facilitated learning from stochastic payout events, we find
a strong effect of the role of financial education. In an independent randomization
28The first stage estimation results are reported in Table A6. The results show a
strong first stage with an overall F-statistic of 85.904, and individual F-statistics for the
different equations are largely above 10. All the directly corresponding coefficients on
payoutijk(∗payoutijl)(∗payoutijm), i.e., the coefficient of lossijk(∗lossijl)(∗lossijm) interacted
with the three interventions, are significant at the 1% level.
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in year 1, we offered financial education about the insurance product to randomly
selected farmers, and showed that attending29 insurance education sessions sig-
nificantly improved understanding of insurance and take-up (Cai, de Janvry, and
Sadoulet, 2015). We see that the trend observed in column (1) is primarily driven
by the sample of households who did not participate in the first year financial
education (column (3)), while for those who received financial education, the first
year payout experience has a significant impact on take-up even after three years
(column (2)). Furthermore, results in column (5) suggest that for farmers who at-
tended insurance education sessions in the first year, receiving a payout provides
a one-time learning effect with no decay over the years (α1, α2, and α3 are very
close and we cannot reject that they are equal). In contrast, for farmers who did
not receive insurance education (column (6)), the recency effect is very strong,
with the early years’ payout experience playing almost no role in influencing the
4th year insurance take-up. Their first year experience is in particular completely
forgotten (all the terms including payout in year 1 are jointly not significant).30
This heterogeneity result suggests that for households who gained a better
grasp of insurance concepts in the first year through financial education, the per-
sonal experience of one payout reinforces their understanding and appreciation
of the benefits of insurance and improves voluntary take-up permanently. Specif-
ically, the most important element of the financial education in our setting was
to use many concrete examples to explain that insurance is a type of product
that you have to purchase repeatedly, and it is very likely that if you do so,
even if disasters only happen rarely, you can get back all the premiums you paid.
The personal experience of disasters and payouts could reinforce farmers’ under-
standing of such concepts, as a result improving voluntary take-up permanently.
By contrast, those who did not have a good initial understanding of insurance
29The attendance of financial education sessions was higher than 90%.
30We also tried an alternative specification which directly test the impact of weather real-
izations on long-run insurance take-up. Results in Table A7 show a similar pattern of effects.
Specifically, columns (2) suggests that for households received financial education, earlier ex-
perience of disasters has a similar impact as recent disaster experience on long-term insurance
take-up, and there is suggestive evidence that the weather effect is stronger among those who
are more likely to take insurance (in free villages or with default buy in year 1, and faced lower
prices in year 2). In contrast, column (3) shows that for farmers who did not receive financial
education, the impact of early year disaster experience on the 4th year take-up is much smaller
than that of the most recent year experience.
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update their insurance take-up decision yearly based on recent experience. For
them, the change in experience with disasters and returns of purchasing insurance
is the main factor affecting their take-up behavior.
Our findings on the mechanisms of the payout effect have important pol-
icy implications. Providing heavy subsidies on insurance premiums can improve
long-term voluntary take-up only if farmers are able to learn about the benefits of
purchasing insurance through their experience with the product. We show that
for farmers with poor financial literacy, such learning does not occur. Instead,
they mainly rely on the recent experience with disasters to update insurance
purchase decisions. As a result, to make subsidy policies effective in promoting
voluntary insurance adoption over time, it has to be combined with other inter-
ventions such as financial education so that farmers have better capacity to learn
from personal experiences with the product.
Although providing financial education can significantly improve the effec-
tiveness of subsidy policies, offering such programs can be very costly. We now
calculate the cost of providing partial subsidies (70%) together with a finan-
cial education program, and compare it to the cost of offering full subsidies for
one year. The financial education cost is mainly composed of the salary of in-
surance agents and transportation cost. In our context, one insurance agent
can finish education for two groups of farmers with about 20 farmers in each
group in a half day, and the daily salary of insurance agents is about 200 RMB.
The average transportation cost from a county branch of the insurance company
to villages is about 50 RMB. Thus the financial education cost per farmer is
(200 ∗ 0.5 + 50)/40 = 3.75 RMB. Scaling this to the average farm size of 12 mu,
this amounts to 0.31 RMB/mu. Consequently, the cost of providing financial
education together with a 70% subsidy equals 0.31 + 12 ∗ 0.7 = 8.71 RMB/mu.
This means that the cost of providing financial education together with a 70%
subsidy is much lower than that of offering full subsidy (12 RMB/mu). At the
same time, the 4th year take-up rate of households who received full subsidy but
no financial education in the first year was about 40%, while that of households
who got 70% subsidy and financial education was significantly higher - about
48%. As a result, in our context, combining financial education with partial
subsidies for one year is more cost-effective than offering full subsidies and no
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education in improving long-term take-up.
VII Other Mechanisms of the Payout Effect
While we shown in the last section that learning about insurance benefits is an
important mechanism of the payout effect, there are other possible channels driv-
ing the effect. In this section we consider the following alternative explanations:
(1) changes in risk aversion or in the perceived probability of future disasters; (2)
improved trust in the insurance company; (3) a liquidity effect.
First, to test the possibility that the experience of payout increases insurance
adoption because it changes participants’ risk aversion or perceived probability of
future disasters, we estimate the impact of receiving or observing payouts on the
second year risk aversion and perceived probability of disasters. Results in Table
A8 show that the impact is small and insignificant. In addition, the estimated
payout effects are robust to controlling for these two household characteristics.
Second, the results can be induced by an improvement in trust in the insurance
company.31 We test and reject the trust channel as follows. We construct a trust
index based on household responses to a question in the second year survey as
to whether they trust the insurance company regarding loss assessment and the
payout issuing process. Regressing this trust index on receiving or observing a
payout shows no effect, in either non-free or free villages (Table A9). Furthermore,
we find that adding the trust index in the regressions of insurance take-up in year
2 on payout does not change the payout coefficients, and the payout effect does
not vary with the level of trust.
Third, farmers who received payouts might face less liquidity constraint and
thus have better capacity to renew the contract. To test for this liquidity effect,
we examine heterogeneity in the effect of one’s own payout on take-up in year 2 by
year 1 area of rice production (as a proxy for household income since it accounts
for 70% of total household income). We find no significant heterogeneous effect
(Table A10). This also suggests that the payout effect holds for both rich and
poor families.
31Cole, Giné, and Vickery (2017) show that being insured improves trust in the insurance
company and that this effect is larger (although not significantly) for those receiving a payout.
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VIII Conclusions
Participation in formal insurance programs is surprisingly low in both developing
and developed countries, and efforts to boost participation by providing infor-
mation, subsidies, and increasing trust have had limited success. In this paper,
we study the case of a new weather insurance product for rice-producing house-
holds in China. We set up a novel experiment where we jointly provide two
interventions: a subsidy policy to encourage earlier adoption and boost personal
experience, and a financial education program on how insurance works. We trace
subsequent adoption after two and four years to measure the long-term impacts
of the two policies, their interactions, and the mechanisms at work.
We show that updating on the value of insurance is dominated by experiencing
payouts. We find a positive effect of receiving a payout on future insurance take-
up, with farmers who paid for their insurance reacting more strongly than those
who received their insurance for free. We further find that there is a strong
discouragement effect when insurance has been paid for and there is no payout,
and that this effect is attenuated by the attention effect when receiving insurance
for free. We also find that observing payouts in your network has an effect on
take-up for those who are uninsured. We find no evidence of price anchoring or
habit formation.
Examining factors driving the payout effects, we show that there is great het-
erogeneity depending on farmers’ initial level of financial literacy. Specifically,
for households who gained insurance knowledge through a randomized first year
financial education program, learning is the main mechanism: personal experi-
ence of payouts reinforced their understanding of insurance concepts, so receiving
a payout even only once improves take-up permanently. By contrast, for farm-
ers with poor insurance literacy, such learning does not occur. They update
insurance take-up decisions yearly based on recent changes in experience with
disasters and returns of purchasing insurance. In that case, subsidies would need
to be continuously provided and adjusted to maintain a good overall take-up rate
depending on the occurrence of disasters.
Our results suggest a new explanation for why learning about insurance is
difficult - the stochastic nature of payouts influences the salience of disasters and
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insurance benefits, and low financial literacy among farmers prevents them from
learning about product benefits from payout experiences. The policy implication
is that in order to make a subsidy policy effective in promoting long-term vol-
untary insurance adoption, it has to be combined with other interventions such
as financial education to improve households’ initial understanding of insurance
so that they have the capacity to learn from experiences with the product. This
insight could be widely applied to the take-up of other products and activities
that involve uncertainty and require time to experience gains or losses.
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Figure 2. Effect of Own Payout on Year 2 Insurance Demand
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
All Non-free Free Difference
PANEL A: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Household Head is Male 0.969 0.973 0.965 0.009
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Household Head Age 53.074 52.855 53.330 -0.475
(0.200) (0.268) (0.301) (0.401)
Household Size 5.231 5.170 5.301 -0.131
(0.041) (0.054) (0.061) (0.082)
Household Head is Literate 0.718 0.716 0.720 -0.003
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
Area of Rice Production (mu) 11.774 11.962 11.556 0.405
(0.202) (0.294) (0.272) (0.405)
Share of Rice Income in Total Income (%) 69.692 68.984 70.494 -1.51
(0.494) (0.643) (0.760) (0.989)
Risk Aversion (0-1, 0 as risk loving and 1 as risk averse) 0.196 0.200 0.193 0.007
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Perceived Probability of Future Disasters (%) 33.030 32.831 33.263 -0.432
(0.269) (0.397) (0.352) (0.539)
Trust Index Year 2 (0-1) 0.602 0.595 0.610 -0.015
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017)
PANEL B: INSURANCE PAYOUT YEAR 1
Payout Rate (% of all households) 40.82 24.18 60.19 -36.00
(0.83) (0.99) (1.22) (1.56)
Payout Rate Among Insured (%) 58.58 56.71 60.91 -4.20
(1.3) (1.76) (1.93) (2.62)
Amount of Payout Received by Insured (RMB, per mu) 102.29 103.24 101.10 2.14
(2.77) (3.80) (4.05) (5.58)
Having at Least One Friend Receiving Payout (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.74 0.68 0.81 -0.13
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.015)
% Friends Receiving Payout (among insured friends) 54.79 54.29 55.31 -1.01
(0.70) (1.06) (0.92) (1.41)
PANEL C: OUTCOME VARIABLE
Insurance Take-up Rate (%), Year One 41.39 42.64 39.91 2.73
(0.84) (1.14) (1.23) (1.68)
Insurance Take-up Rate (%), Year Two 52.85 49.92 56.26 -6.34
(0.85) (1.16) (1.24) (1.70)
No. of Households: 3474
No. of Villages: 134
Sample Mean
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. 1 mu=1/15 hectare; 1 RMB=0.16 USD. In Panel B, payout rate (% of all households) 
indicates the rate of payout among all sample households, regardless of whether they purchased insurance; Payout rate among 
first year insured (%) is defined as the payout rate among households who purchased insurance (nonfree sample) or 
households who were willing to purchase the insurance (free sample). 
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Sample: All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PANEL A: PRICE RANDOMIZATION
Price (RMB/mu) -0.000453 0.00239 -0.000636 0.0885 0.00346 -0.00305 0.00147
(0.00159) (0.0983) (0.0213) (0.100) (0.00468) (0.0026) (0.162)
Observations 3,474 3,471 3,471 3,450 3,471 3474 3,474
R-squared 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.045 0.010 0.009 0.005
PANEL B: FREE RANDOMIZATION
Free Year 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) -0.00838 0.490 0.172 -0.564 0.00460 -0.0056 0.438
(0.00650) (0.498) (0.114) (0.719) (0.0177) (0.0098) (0.450)
Observations 3,474 3,471 3,471 3,450 3,471 3474 3,474
R-squared 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.046 0.010 0.009 0.006
Mean value of dependent variable, Free=0 0.9732 52.8549 5.1699 11.9615 0.7164 0.1997 32.8307
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Effect of First Year Subsidy on Second Year Insurance Demand
Dependent variable:
Sample: All (1) (2) (3)
Price (RMB/mu) -0.0487 -0.0489 -0.0509
(0.00545) (0.00538) (0.00759)
Free Year 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.0597 0.0568 0.0388
(0.0304) (0.0306) (0.0507)
Price * Free Year 1 0.00442
(0.0106)
Household Head is Male -0.0288 -0.0282
(0.0516) (0.0519)
Household Head Age 0.00276 0.00275
(0.000851) (0.000851)
Household Size 0.0115 0.0114
(0.00372) (0.00372)
Household Head is Literate 0.0589 0.0588
(0.0200) (0.0201)
Area of Rice Production (mu) 0.00211 0.00212
(0.000774) (0.000775)
Risk Aversion (0–1) 0.0758 0.0764
(0.0285) (0.0285)
Perceived Probability of Future Disasters (%) 0.000905 0.000906
(0.000536) (0.000537)
Mean value of dependent variable, Free=0 0.4992 0.4992 0.4992
Observations 3,474 3,442 3,442
R-squared 0.036 0.049 0.049
P-value of joint significance test:
    Price and Price*Free 0.0000
    Free and Price*Free 0.1788
Insurance Take-up Year 2 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 1 mu=1/15 hectare; 1 RMB=0.16 USD. 
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Table 4. Effect of Receiving Payouts on Second Year Insurance Demand
Dependent variable:
Sample: Insurance Take-up Year 1=Yes All Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Price -0.0441 -0.0778 -0.0716 -0.0469 -0.0639 -0.0673 -0.0464
(0.00868) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.00998) (0.0196) (0.0217) (0.00656)
Payout (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.368 0.102 0.204 0.168 0.0479 0.0613 0.368
(0.0355) (0.0827) (0.109) (0.0406) (0.0860) (0.124) (0.0349)
Price * Payout 0.0642 0.0526 0.0306 0.0360
(0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0224) (0.0262)
Free Year 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.102
(0.0479)
Payout*Free Year 1 -0.172
(0.0566)
Loss rate in yield -0.00198 0.00480
(0.00303) (0.00493)
Square of loss rate in yield 0.000023 -0.000067
(0.000031) (0.00005)
Mean value of dependent variable 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.563 0.563 0.563 0.528
Observations 790 790 790 632 632 632 1,422
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.243 0.263 0.261 0.128 0.133 0.137 0.17
P-value of joint significance test: Price 
and Price*Payout 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
Payout and Price*Payout 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0276
Payout and Payout*Free 0.0000
Free and Payout*Free 0.0098
Non-free Year 1 Free Year 1
Insurance Take-up Year 2 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Note: This table is based on the sample of households who purchased insurance (nonfree) or agreed to purchase insurance  (free) with 70% 
government subsidies in Year 1. In columns (3) and (6), payout is instrumented by the cutoff of yield loss to receive payout. Household 
characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice production area, household size, risk attitude, and the perceived 
probability of future disasters. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price -0.0463 -0.0400 -0.0465 -0.0436 -0.0419
(0.0055) (0.0109) (0.0086) (0.0113) (0.0103)
High Network Payout Rate (NetPayHigh) 0.2371 0.211 0.0555 0.2094 -0.0139
(0.0312) (0.0368) (0.0574) (0.0654) (0.0672)
Payout (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.4073 0.2173 0.203
(0.0532) (0.0696) (0.0578)
NetPayHigh*Payout -0.0142 -0.1982 -0.0136
(0.0810) (0.0859) (0.0828)
Free Year 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.1303
(0.0410)
NetPayHigh*Free Year 1 -0.102
(0.0500)
Mean value of dependent variable 0.528 0.377 0.664 0.476 0.691
Observations 3179 962 665 918 625
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.096 0.175 0.304 0.097 0.134
P-value of joint significance test: 
HighNet and HighNet*Free 0.0000
Free and HighNet*Free 0.0065
Note: High network payout rate is defined as equal to 1 if network payout rate >=0.5 and 0 otherwise. Household 
characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice production area, household size, risk attitude, 
and the perceived probability of future disasters. Regressions in columns (2) and (3) also control for the proportion of friends in 
one's social network who have purchased the insurance in the first year, instrumented with the network members' average 
default option and financial education. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
Non-free Free
Insurance Take-up Year 2 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payout 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.0599 0.242 0.0245 0.112 0.422 0.0542
(0.0534) (0.109) (0.0483) (0.0529) (0.113) (0.0447)
Payout 2 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.181 0.265 0.238 0.341 0.429 0.507
(0.122) (0.127) (0.155) (0.136) (0.215) (0.168)
Payout 3 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.569 0.340 0.653 0.636 0.472 0.625
(0.0797) (0.0928) (0.0883) (0.120) (0.129) (0.125)
Payout 1 * Payout 2 -0.100 -0.267 -0.0812
(0.177) (0.274) (0.193)
Payout 1 * Payout 3 -0.135 -0.339 0.0139
(0.141) (0.146) (0.166)
Payout 2 * Payout 3 -0.610 -0.280 -0.600
(0.511) (0.796) (0.491)
Payout 1 * Payout 2 * Payout 3 0.447 -0.428 0.224
(0.757) (1.429) (0.595)
Mean value of dependent variable, Free=0 0.4361 0.51 0.389 0.4361 0.51 0.389
Observations 3,442 1,331 2,111 3,442 1,331 2,111
R-squared 0.073 0.139 0.135 0.073 0.248 0.192
First stage F-statistics 85.904 42.165 56.871 38.067 24.523 27.334
  Payout 2+Payout 1*Payout 2=0 0.0592 0.1631 0.0008
  Payout 3+Payout 1*Payout 3=0 0.0000 0.1529 0.0000
  Payout 3+Payout 2*Payout 3=0 0.9524 0.7856 0.9531
  Payout 1+Payout 1*Payout 2=0 0.9454 0.5344 0.8875
  Payout 1+Payout 1*Payout 3=0 0.8706 0.5618 0.6678
  Payout 2+Payout 2*Payout 3=0 0.5991 0.8410 0.8378
  Payout 1+Payout 2+Payout 1*Payout 2+ 
Payout 1*Payout 3+Payout 2*Payout 3=0 0.5675 0.9704 0.8665
  Payout 2 < Payout 1 0.1078 0.4334 0.058 0.0289 0.4862 0.0027
  Payout 3 < Payout 1 0.0000 0.2991 0.0000 0.0001 0.3895 0.0000
  Payout 3 < Payout 2 0.0195 0.3432 0.0335 0.0633 0.4213 0.2880
Joint significance of all terms including 
Payout 1 0.1885 0.0032 0.6705
Note: This table presents the instrumental variable estimation results of the payout effects in the long-term. Payout i refers to Payout in 
year i. Columns (1) and (3) are based on the whole sample, columns (2) and (4) on households that receive financial education, and 
columns (3) and (6) on households that did not receive financial education. All regressions include insurance take-up decisions in years 
1 to 3.  Instruments include: the randomized three interventions - first year free distribution, first year default, and second year price - 
and the interactions of the loss dummy in year i (=1 if loss >30% and =0 otherwise), loss dummy i * loss dummy j, and loss dummy 1 * 
loss dummy 2* loss dummy 3 with each of the three randomized interventions.  All regressions also include region fixed effects and 
household characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
Insurance Take-up Year 4 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Test B: Attention to last payout only tests (p-values)
Test C: Decay of payout effects tests (p-values)
Test A: One-time learning tests (p-values)
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Appendix - Supplementary Tables
Dependent variable:
Correct Answer to Price 
Questions (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Insurance Take-up Year 2          
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Sample: All





Free Year 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) -0.0184 0.0034
(0.0190) (0.0578)
Mean value of dependent 
variable, Free=0 0.8256 0.5779
Observations 3,442 1,855
Household characteristics Yes Yes
R-squared 0.040 0.029
Note: In the second year survey we asked each farmer what is the current year post-subsidy insurance price 
and whether they expect further price drop. The dependent variable of column (1) is a dummy variable equal 
to one if a farmer answered the two questions correctly, and zero otherwise. In column (2), we combine the 
free sample with a price randomization sample with zero price assignments during the first year. Household 
characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice production area, household 
size, risk attitude, and the perceived probability of future disasters. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
village level in parentheses. 
Table A1. The Impact of Free Treatment on the Expectation of Price Drop in Year 2
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Dependent variable:
Sample: Insurance Takeup Year 1 = 1 All 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price -0.0436 -0.0710 -0.0460 -0.0561 -0.0457
(0.0088) (0.0124) (0.0098) (0.0159) (0.0067)
Amount of Payout (1000 RMB) 1.5208 0.3384 0.5336 0.1036 1.5578
(0.1641) (0.3583) (0.1926) (0.4622) (0.1548)
Price * Amount of Payout 0.2942 0.1088
(0.0789) (0.1150)
Free Year 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.1018
(0.0418)
Payout*Free Year 1 -0.8647
(0.2408)
Mean value of dependent variable 0.499 0.499 0.563 0.563 0.528
Observations 790 790 632 632 1,422
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.229 0.243 0.117 0.118 0.150
P-value of joint significance test: Price 
and Price*Payout 0.0000 0.0001
Payout and Price*Payout 0.0000 0.0222
Payout and Payout*Free 0.0020
Free and Payout*Free 0.0000
Nonfree Year 1 Free Year 1
Insurance take-up Year 2 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Table A2. Compare the Effect of the Amount of Payouts under Different Subsidy Policies, 
Insurance Takeup Year 1 = 1
Note: This table is based on the sample of households who purchased insurance (nonfree) or agreed to purchase 
insurance (free) with 70% government subsidies in Year 1. Household characteristics include gender, age, level of 
education of the household head, rice production area, household size, risk attitude, and the perceived probability of 




Not insured in 
Year 1
Insured (not free) 
in Year 1
Insured (for free) 
in Year 1 All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price -0.0392 -0.0657 -0.0243 -0.0458
(0.0108) (0.0156) (0.0278) (0.0054)
Network Payout (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.218 -0.117 0.0894 0.2586
(0.0469) (0.0843) (0.1313) (0.0354)
Payout 0.4169 0.1868
(0.0410) (0.0477)
Network Payout*Payout 0.0266 -0.0219
(0.0177) (0.0296)
Free Year 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.1508
(0.0503)
Network Payout * Free Year 1 -0.1479
(0.0596)
Mean value of dependent variable 0.377 0.664 0.691 0.528
Observations 962 665 625 3,179
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.175 0.309 0.134 0.097
P-value of joint significance test: 
Network Payout and Free*Network 
Payout 0.0000
Free and Free*Network Payout 0.0129
Table A3. Effect of Observing Friends Receiving Payouts on Second Year Insurance Demand 
Insurance Take-up Year 2 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Note: Network payout rate is defined as equal to 1 if network payout rate >0 and 0 otherwise. Household characteristics 
include gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice production area, household size, risk attitude, and the 
perceived probability of future disasters. Regressions in columns (2) and (3) also control for the proportion of friends in 
one's social network who have purchased the insurance in the first year, instrumented with the network members' average 
default option and financial education. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
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Dependent variable: Attendance (0-1)
Answer to payout 




(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Sample: Insurance Take-up Year 1 = 1 (1) (2) (3)
Free Year 1 -0.0148 -0.156 -0.112
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0135) (0.0446) (0.0368)
Mean value of dependent variable
First year takers, non-free 0.867 0.587 0.498
First year non-takers, non-free 0.862 0.313 0.240
First year non-takers, free 0.852 0.362 0.322
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,422
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.214 0.140 0.076
Table A4. Effect of Subsidy Policies on Attention to the Product and Investment
Note: This table is based on the sample of households who purchased insurance (nonfree) or agreed to purchase 
insurance (free) in Year 1. In the second year survey we asked each farmer the share of households received insurance 
payout in their village last year, the average magnitude of payout, and who received payout. The dependent variable 
of columns (2) is the correct rate of answers to those questions. We also asked each farmer whether they increased 
investment on rice production last year. The dependent variable of column (3) is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
farmer answered yes, and zero otherwise. Household characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the 
household head, rice production area, household size, risk attitude, and the perceived probability of future disasters. 







Free Year 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.0146 0.1142
(0.0350) (0.0950)
Price * Free Year 1 -0.0398
(0.0374)
Mean value of dependent variable, 
Free=0 0.4992 0.4992
Observations 746 746
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0182 0.0197
P-value of joint significance test: 
Price and Price*Free 0.3910
Free and Price*Free 0.4821
Table A5. Test Price Anchoring Effect
Insurance Take-up Year 2 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Year 1 Takeup = 1, Price <= 3.6
Note: This table is based on the sample of households that either purchased or were willing to 
purchase the insurance at 3.6 RMB/mu in the first year, and were offered the insurance at a 
price less or equal to 3.6 RMB/mu in the second year. Household characteristics include 
gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice production area, and household 
size. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
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VARIABLES Payout 1 Payout 2 Payout 3 Payout 1*Payout2 Payout 1*Payout3 Payout 2*Payout3
Payout 1*Payout2 
*Payout3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Loss dummy 1*Free 0.621 0.00123 0.00412 0.000880 -0.000689 0.000861 0.000482
(0.0330) (0.00546) (0.00949) (0.00289) (0.00389) (0.00226) (0.00119)
Loss dummy 2*Free -0.00897 0.247 0.0261 0.00262 0.00553 0.00528 0.00225
(0.0356) (0.0817) (0.0161) (0.00449) (0.00687) (0.00342) (0.00185)
Loss dummy 3*Free -0.0208 0.00597 0.198 0.00385 0.0114 0.000806 0.00191
(0.0229) (0.00586) (0.0423) (0.00300) (0.00804) (0.00206) (0.00109)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 2*Free 0.0440 -0.128 -0.00727 0.257 -0.000545 -0.00291 -0.000785
(0.0556) (0.111) (0.0183) (0.0788) (0.00825) (0.00431) (0.00274)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 3*Free 0.109 -0.00748 0.0973 -0.00547 0.418 -0.00124 -0.00172
(0.0380) (0.00655) (0.0589) (0.00340) (0.0347) (0.00238) (0.00131)
Loss dummy 2*Loss dummy 3*Free 0.0474 -0.0503 0.161 2.58e-05 0.0330 0.0826 -0.00198
(0.0386) (0.128) (0.0962) (0.00676) (0.0441) (0.0832) (0.00251)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 2 -0.0899 0.469 -0.289 0.395 -0.149 0.0903 0.225
        *Loss dummy 3*Free (0.0868) (0.162) (0.152) (0.0955) (0.117) (0.135) (0.0929)
Loss dummy 1*Default 0.163 -0.000208 -0.00210 -0.000982 0.000304 0.000690 0.00230
(0.0488) (0.00668) (0.0114) (0.00425) (0.00613) (0.00316) (0.00180)
Loss dummy 2*Default 0.0598 0.104 0.0321 0.00316 0.00774 0.00742 0.00315
(0.0349) (0.0772) (0.0161) (0.00530) (0.00687) (0.00455) (0.00225)
Loss dummy 3*Default -0.0186 0.00152 0.184 0.00143 -0.00588 0.000605 0.00188
(0.0233) (0.00612) (0.0487) (0.00376) (0.00933) (0.00244) (0.00139)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 2*Default -0.00472 0.129 -0.0163 0.168 -0.00388 -0.00393 -0.00178
(0.0781) (0.104) (0.0174) (0.0760) (0.00853) (0.00449) (0.00233)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 3*Default 0.0765 0.000474 0.0810 -0.00107 0.200 0.000290 -0.00138
(0.0512) (0.00678) (0.0626) (0.00398) (0.0376) (0.00250) (0.00154)
Loss dummy 2*Loss dummy 3*Default 0.0399 -0.144 0.00935 0.000549 0.0443 0.0424 -0.00505
(0.0393) (0.122) (0.107) (0.00846) (0.0422) (0.0867) (0.00358)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 2 -0.223 0.0293 -0.0466 -0.183 -0.192 -0.00926 -0.0167
        *Loss dummy 3*Default (0.125) (0.168) (0.147) (0.107) (0.103) (0.119) (0.0727)
Loss dummy 1*Price 0.0539 -0.00158 0.000690 -0.000813 0.000863 -0.000287 -0.000295
(0.00644) (0.000962) (0.00186) (0.000451) (0.000753) (0.000374) (0.000221)
Loss dummy 2*Price -0.012 0.0404 -0.00582 -0.000476 -0.00214 -0.00128 -0.000421
(0.00421) (0.0110) (0.00241) (0.000841) (0.00113) (0.000706) (0.000368)
Loss dummy 3*Price -0.000855 -0.000955 0.0361 -0.000330 0.000248 -0.000189 -0.000305
(0.00387) (0.00114) (0.00754) (0.000615) (0.00127) (0.000392) (0.000209)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 2*Price 0.00342 0.0295 0.00322 0.0399 0.00116 0.000811 0.000271
(0.0137) (0.0140) (0.00280) (0.0109) (0.00126) (0.000723) (0.000458)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 3*Price -0.0227 0.000737 0.00945 0.000751 0.0102 0.000169 0.000215
(0.00834) (0.00107) (0.0106) (0.000656) (0.00597) (0.000422) (0.000253)
Loss dummy 2*Loss dummy 3*Price 0.00285 -4.55e-05 0.00987 0.000105 -0.00437 0.0218 0.000547
(0.00684) (0.0182) (0.0167) (0.00101) (0.00665) (0.0127) (0.000421)
Loss dummy 1*Loss dummy 2 0.00933 -0.0131 0.0136 -0.00683 0.0297 0.0178 0.0291
        *Loss dummy 3*Price (0.0219) (0.0251) (0.0228) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0176) (0.0104)
Free -0.0234 -0.0403 -0.0793 -0.0152 -0.0194 -0.00989 -0.00548
(0.0252) (0.00842) (0.0138) (0.00496) (0.00647) (0.00342) (0.00216)
Default -0.0777 -0.0354 -0.0622 -0.0116 -0.0167 -0.0103 -0.00622
(0.0240) (0.00999) (0.0162) (0.00642) (0.00894) (0.00445) (0.00315)
Price -0.0300 -0.0134 -0.0290 -0.00467 -0.00743 -0.00361 -0.00130
(0.00464) (0.00188) (0.00304) (0.00111) (0.00172) (0.000907) (0.000457)
Observations 3,442 3,442 3,442 3,442 3,442 3,442 3,442
R-squared 0.574 0.382 0.299 0.411 0.331 0.193 0.211
First-stage F statistics 198.828 22.866 43.169 12.594 21.195 3.444 7.982
Note: This table presents the first stage results of the IV estimation of payout effects in the long-term (Table 6). Payout i refers to Payout in year i. Loss dummy i is a dummy 
variable equaling to one if the loss rate in year i is larger than 30% and zero otherwise. All regressions also include region fixed effects and household characteristics. Household 
characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice production area, household size, risk attitude, and the perceived probability of future disasters. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
Table A6. Payout Effects in the Long-term: First Stage of the IV Estimation
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Dependent variable:
Sample: All Financial education=1 Financial education=0
(1) (2) (3)
Loss dummy 1 0.110 0.237 0.0131
(0.0502) (0.0701) (0.0640)
Loss dummy 2 0.193 0.169 0.199
(0.0554) (0.0832) (0.0762)
Loss dummy 3 0.273 0.174 0.369
(0.0461) (0.0690) (0.0586)
Loss dummy 1 * Free 0.0636 0.141 0.0655
(0.0443) (0.0546) (0.0499)
Loss dummy 2 * Free 0.0608 0.121 0.0162
(0.0461) (0.0580) (0.0645)
Loss dummy 3 * Free 0.0271 0.00235 -0.00624
(0.0388) (0.0569) (0.0486)
Loss dummy 1 * Default 0.0949 0.106 0.0454
(0.0429) (0.0617) (0.0516)
Loss dummy 2 * Default 0.0518 0.0704 0.0413
(0.0449) (0.0639) (0.0636)
Loss dummy 3 * Default -0.00277 -0.00366 0.00763
(0.0395) (0.0548) (0.0487)
Loss dummy 1 * Price -0.00847 -0.0173 0.000300
(0.00810) (0.0128) (0.0106)
Loss dummy 2 * Price -0.0147 -0.0281 -0.00339
(0.0114) (0.0186) (0.0160)
Loss dummy 3 * Price -0.0206 -0.0167 -0.0265
(0.00786) (0.0128) (0.0105)
Free 0.0399 0.0664 0.0531
(0.0361) (0.0489) (0.0432)
Default 0.00818 0.0234 -0.00131
(0.0396) (0.0572) (0.0440)
Price 0.00406 0.0149 -0.00106
(0.00697) (0.0113) (0.00921)
Mean value of dependent variable, Free=0 0.4361 0.51 0.389
Observations 3,442 1,331 2,111
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.113 0.143 0.13
Table A7. Payout Effects in the Long-term: Reduced Form Estimation
Insurance Take-up Year 4 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Note: This table presents the reduced form estimation results of the payout effects in the long-term. lossdummy i refers to 
loss indicator in year i  (=1 if loss >30% and =0 otherwise). Column (1) is based on the whole sample, column (2) uses 
households that receive financial education, and colums (3) is based on households that did not receive financial education. 
Free, Default, and Price refer to the randomized interventions of first year free distribution, first year default, and second 
year prices, respectively.  Household characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice 
production area, household size, risk attitude, and the perceived probability of future disasters. Robust standard errors 




Year 1 Take-up 
= Yes
Year 1 Take-up 
= No All
Year 1 Take-up 
= Yes
Year 1 Take-up 
= No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Free Year 1 0.00282 0.00721 -0.0061 -0.294 -0.887 2.260
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0105) (0.0260) -0.0194 (0.829) (1.651) (1.833)
Payout 0.0302 1.900
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0216) (1.522)
Free Year 1 * Payout -0.00925 0.0921
(0.0328) (2.262)
High Network Payout 0.005 0.176
(= 1 if % > median, and 0 otherwise) (0.0180) (1.574)
Free Year 1 * High Network Payout 0.0156 -3.030
(0.0265) (2.294)
Mean value of dependent variable, 
Free=0 0.151 0.151 0.151 24.942 24.942 24.942
Observations 3,442 1,422 1,880 3,442 1,422 1,880
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.026 0.034 0.031 0.019 0.025 0.027
P-value of joint significance test: 
Payout and Free Year 1*payout 0.2497 0.2435
High Network Payout and Free Year 
1*High Network Payout 0.5064 0.2284
Free Year 1 0.9566 0.8070 0.7050 0.4017
Risk Aversion Year 2 (0-1)
Perceived Probability of Future Disasters 
Year 2
Table A8.  Effect of Receiving or Observing Payouts on Risk Aversion and Perceived Probability of Disasters
Note: Household characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice production area, and household size. 




Year 1 Take-up 
= Yes
Year 1 Take-up 
= No
(1) (2) (5)
Free Year 1 0.0134 0.0272 -0.0313
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0198) (0.0449) (0.0348)
Payout -0.0527
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0390)
Free Year 1 * Payout 0.0120
(0.0591)
High Network Payout 0.0006
(= 1 if % > median, and 0 otherwise) (0.0321)
Free Year 1 * High Network Payout 0.0499
(0.0478)
Observations 3,442 1,422 1,880
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.030 0.042 0.040
P-value of joint significance test: 
Payout and Free Year 1*payout 0.2495
High Network Payout and Free Year 
1*High Network Payout 0.3300
Free Year 1 0.4815 0.5705
Table A9.  Effect of Receiving or Observing Payouts on Trust
Trust on the Insurance Company Year 2 (0-1)
Note: Household characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the household head, 
rice production area, household size, risk attitude, and the perceived probability of future 
disasters. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
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Dependent variable:





(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0549) (0.0496)
Area of Rice Production (mu) 0.0084 0.000867
(0.00596) (0.00322)
Payout*Area of Rice Production -0.00236 0.000513
(0.00530) (0.00289)
Mean value of dependent variable, Free=0 0.4992 0.4992
Observations 724 618
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes
R-squared 0.264 0.136
P-value of joint significance test: Payout and 
Payout*Income 0.0000 0.0002
Income and Payout*Income 0.0000 0.0005
Table A10. Heterogeneity of the Payout Effect, Insurance Take-up Year 1 = 1
Insurance take-up Year 2 (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Note: Household characteristics include gender, age, level of education of the household head, rice 
production area, household size, risk attitude, and the perceived probability of future disasters. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.  
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